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Canadian historians have devoted considerable attention to post-war agitation 
on the Prairies; they have virtually ignored similar agitation in the Maritimes, 
the regional protest movement which became known by the slogan "Mari-
time Rights." The few comments it has received, in biographical literature 
or in sweeping analyses of long periods of history, have been largely con-
cerned with its political manifestations.1 Such a pre-occupation is not sur-
prising. Both Liberals and Conservatives were vociferous in their efforts to 
portray themselves as the champions of the movement. Shortly before the 
Antigonish-Guysborough by-election of 1927 a Protestant clergyman set out 
to review the issues of the campaign from the pulpit. Both candidates, he 
noted, were clamouring for attention as the defenders of "Maritime Rights." 
This aspect of their campaign, he said, reminded him of the behaviour of his 
own young children one evening when he and his wife were getting ready to 
go visiting. The little girl set up an awful howl from the moment the baby-
sitter arrived. She bawled and bawled and bawled. Finally, just as her parents 
were going out the door, her brother turned, slapped her sharply, and de-
clared, "Shut up, I wanna cry." 
There was much more to "Maritime Rights" than the conspicuous wail of 
the politicians. One cannot begin to tell here the story of the movement—the 
intensive organizational campaign with its delegations to Ottawa, economic 
conferences, and country-wide speaking tours; the erratic swings in the popu-
lar vote from one party to another as Maritimers searched desperately for 
solutions to their problems; and the inevitable royal commissions sent in to 
defuse the agitation2 — but one can at least attempt a more basic introduction 
1 See J. M. Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia (Toronto, 1957), pp. 338-40;W. R. Graham, 
Arthur Meighen Vol. II; And Fortune Fled (Toronto, 1963), ch. 11; H. B. Neatby, William Lyon 
Mackenzie King: 1924 - 1932; The Lonely Heights (Toronto, 1963), pp. 67 and 220-24; K. A. 
MacKirdy, "Regionalism: Canada and Australia" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1959), pp. 
245-50; and G. A. Rawlyk, "The Maritimes and the Canadian Community" in M. Wade, ed., 
Regionalism in the Canadian Community, 1867-1967 (Toronto, 1969) pp. 113-5. The only previous 
study which focused directly on Maritime Rights was Michael Hatfield, "J. B. Baxter and the 
Maritime Rights Movement" (B.A. honours essay, Mount Allison University, 1969). 
2 E. R. Forbes, "The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927; A Study in Canadian Regionalism," 
(Ph.D. thesis, Queens University, 1975). 
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through the analysis of the motives of the different social groups which 
participated in it. Their behaviour suggests that the issues involved went much 
deeper than mere political manoeuvering or even, as professor G. A. Rawlyk 
has suggested, the attempt by the local "Establishment" to undercut other 
forms of social protest.3 All classes in the region, although often in conflict 
on other issues, were united in their support of Maritime Rights. Each was 
aware that its own particular aspirations were incapable of realization until 
the region's declining influence was checked or reversed. 
The social categories employed here will be those used by the people them-
selves. Maritimers spoke frequently in this period of their "classes." They 
were not referring to any clear Marxian structure nor did they imply the 
status-based stratification of the modern sociologist. Essentially they were 
talking about broad occupational interest groups. Such divisions were partly 
theoretical; the members of each group of "class" were assumed to have 
interests in common of which not all might be conscious. But they also had 
an empirical basis through such exclusively occupational organizations as the 
Maritime Division of the Canadian Manufacturers Association, retail mer-
chants associations, the United Farmers, federations of labour and, by the end 
of the decade, the Maritime Fishermen's Union. These were the kinds of 
groupings to which New Brunswick Premier P. J. Veniot referred early in 
1923 when he reported to Mackenzie King that, after looking "carefully into 
the [Maritime Rights] movement," he had found it was "purely non-political 
and embraces [the] efforts of all classes to obtain what is sincerely considered 
fair play for [the] Maritime Provinces."4 
The development of Maritime regionalism, of which the Maritime Rights 
movement formed the climax, took place largely in the first two decades of 
the century. Previously, popular loyalties had been focused upon larger im-
perial or national entities or upon smaller political, cultural or geographical 
units. The shift was dictated by a growing realization of the need for co-
operation. Co-operation was essential if the three Atlantic Provinces were to 
counteract the eclipse of their influence which resulted from the rise of the 
West and the growing metropolitan dominance of Central Canada. Another 
factor contributing to the growth of regionalism was the progressive ideology 
of the period, which increased the pressure upon the small governments for 
expensive reforms while at the same time suggesting the possibility of limitless 
achievement through a strategy of unity, organization and agitation. Conse-
quently, regional awareness increased sharply in the three provinces. Their 
leaders joined forces to fight losses in representation, which followed every 
3 G. A. Rawlyk "The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia," 
Laurier La Pierre et al eds., Essays on the Left (Toronto, 1971), pp. 37-8. 
4 P. J. Veniot to W. L. M. King, 27 February 1923, W. L. M. King Papers, Public Archives of 
Canada (hereafter PAC). 
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census after 1891; to increase their subsidies, which had fallen far behind 
those of the Prairies; and to defend the Intercolonial Railway, whose pro-
Maritime policies came under attack from both the Prairies and Central 
Canada.5 
The manufacturers' stake in the regionalization of the Maritimes was most 
obvious, particularly for the defense of the Intercolonial Railway. By the end 
of the 19th Century that railway had become an important agent of industrial-
ization in the region. Its management had accepted the principle that half a 
loaf was better than none and had reduced rates to develop traffic. It created 
a basic freight rate structure which was between 20 and 50 percent lower than 
that in force in Ontario and offered in addition special rate concessions based 
upon "what the traffic would bear."6 Built into the structure was a system of 
"arbitraries" or especially low rates between the Maritimes and Montreal 
on goods destined for points further west. These rates enabled the secondary 
manufacturers in the Maritimes to penetrate markets in Western and Central 
Canada to obtain the sales volume necessary for competitive production.7 
With such encouragement, capital investment in manufacturing in the Mari-
times quadrupled between 1900 and 1920.8 The old dream of some Nova 
Scotian entrepreneurs that their province would play the role of a great in-
dustrial metropolis to a Canadian hinterland was far from realization. But the 
Maritimers' optimism for their manufacturing potential persisted. The Halifax 
Morning Chronicle in 1906 explicitly touted Nova Scotia's pioneer pro-
gramme in technical education as encouraging the industrialization which 
would reverse the region's declining status in Confederation. The Saint John 
Standard in 1916 enthused about a hydro-electric project to harness the Bay 
of Fundy tides, which, by providing cheaper energy for manufacturing, would 
raise the Maritimes "to a position of commercial supremacy as compared with 
any other part of the Dominion."9 
Such aspirations received a severe check with the integration of the Inter-
colonial into a national system. The happy partnership between the Inter-
colonial management and the local producers had come under attack both 
5 See Canada, Sessional Papers (1910), No. 100; Halifax Wesleyan, 12 May 1909; Saint John 
Standard, 30 October 1913; W. Eggleston and C. T. Kraft, Dominion Provincial Subsidies and 
Grants (Ottawa, 1939) pp. 188-9; and the "Presentation to his Royal Highness in Council of the 
claims of the Provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, for Compensa-
tion in Respect of the Public Lands of Canada, transferred to Certain Provinces of Canada or held 
in trust for their Benefit, January 29, 1913," R. L. Borden Papers, p. 5249, PAC. 
6 R. A. C. Henry and Associates, Railway Freight Rates in Canada (Ottawa, 1939), pp. 266 and 
268 and Transcripts of the hearings of the Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, pp. 462-5, 
Atlantic Provinces Transportation Commission (hereafter APTC). 
7 See S. A. Saunders The Economic History of the Maritime Provinces (Ottawa, 1939), p. 27. 
8 Canada Year Book (1922-3), pp. 220, 415-6. 
9 Halifax Morning Chronicle, 17 August 1906 and Saint John Standard, 25 March 1916. 
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from competing Central Canadian manufacturers and Prairie farmers pre-
occupied with their demand for the equalization of freight rates. 10The Borden 
Government apparently decided to get rid of the anomaly of a Maritime-
oriented railway once and for all. In November, 1918, it shifted the Inter-
colonial's headquarters to Toronto, transferred its senior officials to other 
lines and replaced them with appointees from the Canadian Northern. The 
following year, the Intercolonial was placed under the de facto jurisdiction of 
the Board of Railway Commissioners which raised the rates to the Ontario 
level.11 The process was completed in time to provide an inflated base for 
the 40 per cent general rate increase of 1920. In Ontario and Quebec freight 
rates increased 111% between 1916 and September 1920; in the Maritimes 
basic rates rose between 140 and 216% and the simultaneous cancellation of 
special rates, such as the special commodity rate on sugar, led to still greater 
increases.12 
The rate changes not only threatened the local entrepreneurs' dreams of 
industrial grandeur, but left them seriously exposed to the pressure for metro-
politan consolidation. For many, the campaign for Maritime Rights became 
a struggle for survival. In 1919 a group of manufacturers mounted a delega-
tion to Ottawa, demanded the restoration of the Intercolonial to independent 
management and revived the Maritime Board of Trade as a channel for their 
agitation.13 They continued to play a prominent role in the leadership of the 
movement through such representatives as W. S. Fisher of Saint John, a for-
mer Canadian Manufacturers' Association president, who served as a spokes-
man for another delegation to Ottawa in 1921, and D. R. Turnbull, managing-
director of the Acadia Sugar Corporation, who, in 1925, became Nova Scotia's 
representative on the newly-formed Maritime Rights Transportation Com-
mittee.14 
Maritime merchants were also seriously affected by the integration of the 
Intercolonial into a national system. The wholesalers were injured by the shift 
in supply purchasing for the railway from the Maritimes to Toronto.15 They 
were weakened further, in relation to their metropolitan competitors, by the 
10 Judgement of the Board of Railway Commissioners, 15 March 1919, R. L. Border Papers, pp. 
131069-9, PAC,- Canada, Debates (1917), pp. 787, 4339-77. 
11 Transcript of hearings of the Board of Railway Commissioners, 1920, p. 11703, PAC. 
12 Calculated from percentages in B.R.C. transcripts 1926, p. 6602, and from "standard mileage 
rates" in R.A.C. Henry, op. cit. 
13 Sackville, The Busy East of Canada, September, 1919. 
14 "Report of Meeting with the Prime Minister and the members of the Government, Delega-
tion from the Maritime Province," 1 June 1921, R. B. Bennett Papers, p. 10142, P.A.C. and F. C. 
Cornell to H. D. Cartwright, 12 October 1925, Maritime Provinces Freight Rate Commission 
Papers, APTC. 
15 E. M. Macdonald to Mackenzie King, 8 December 1922, W. L. M. King Papers, PAC. 
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sharp increase in "town distributing rates" — especially low rates which had 
enabled them to import quantities of goods from Central Canada, break them 
up and send them out to individual towns and villages at little more than the 
cost of direct shipment. Similarly higher rates on the Intercolonial accelerated 
the shift away from Maritime ports as distributing points for products entering 
from abroad. H. R. Silver, a commission merchant, reported a decline in 
molasses shipments out of Halifax from 130 carloads in 1916 to 17 in 1921.16 
Retailers were also adversely affected. They had to pay more for their goods 
and had difficulty in passing the full charge on to their customers. The Halifax 
Maritime Merchant commented tersely in 1920 upon the general effect of the 
increase: "Added to the handicap already suffered by firms seeking western 
business, the new rate will be hard on the merchants and add materially to the 
cost the local consumer must pay."17 
The issue which generated the greatest heat from the merchant and com-
mercial interests of Halifax and Saint John was the development of their 
ports as entrepôts for Canada's winter trade. The two cities were engaged in 
a Darwinian struggle with the American seaports and with each other. The 
key to victory was volume and variety of traffic. The more traffic, the lower 
the port charges and ocean rates,- the lower the rates, the greater the traffic. 
The Maritime ports were most conscious of their rivalry with Portland, Maine, 
which had traditionally enjoyed the advantage of a very active canvass for 
trade from the Grand Trunk Railway.18 The Maritime ports' aspirations for 
Canadian trade, aroused initially by Confederation, had blossomed under the 
"national policy" of the Laurier Government. Laurier had promised that the 
National Transcontinental Railway would channel exports, particularly 
grain, through national ports. In 1903, he appointed a Royal Commission to 
investigate other means of routing trade through "all-Canadian channels," 
and in 1911, he pledged that his government would restrict the Imperial 
preference to goods entering through Canadian ports.19 
Such expectations were rudely shaken by the federal take-over of the 
Grand Trunk. With it, the Canadian Government inherited a strong vested 
interest in the commercial success of Portland. At Halifax, prominent Liber-
als urged the return of a Conservative cabinet minister in the by-election of 
1920 to give the Maritimes at least a voice in defending their port's interest.20 
Early in 1922 the Halifax and Saint John boards of trade appointed a joint 
16 F. C. Cornell "Memorandum re the Transportation Problems and Freight Rate Structure of 
the Province of Nova Scotia," 1926, p. 10 and Transcripts, B.R.C., 1926, pp. 6765-7, PAC. 
17 Maritime Merchant, 16 September 1920, p. 104. 
18 Transcripts, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, p. 2173, APTC. 
19 "Report of the Royal Commission on Transportation . . . 1903," Canada, Sessional Papers 
(1906), No. 19a,- Canada, Debates (1922), pp. 708-10. 
20 Halifax Herald, 18 September 1920. 
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committee, consisting largely of merchants and manufacturers, to co-ordinate 
their agitation on such issues as the restoration of the Intercolonial and the 
routing of trade through Maritime Ports.21 The merchant's position in the 
Maritime Rights movement continued to be a prominent one through the 
organized activities of boards of trade and the role of individuals such as 
W. A. Black, of the leading merchant-shipping firm of Pickford and Black. At 
seventy-six years of age, against "his physicians' advice, his wife's fears and 
his family's opposition," Black came out of retirement to fight the Halifax 
by-election of 1923 on a platform of Maritime Rights. 22 
Another business group, the lumbermen, also jointed the agitation. For 
them, the impact of the increased freight rates was compounded in 1921 by 
increased American duty on timber products under the Fordney tariff. 
Angus MacLean of The Bathurst Company, later president of the New Bruns-
wick Lumberman's Association, appealed to Mackenzie King for relief on 
both issues.23 When none was forthcoming he and other so-called "Lumber 
lords" of New Brunswick such as Archie and Donald Fraser, owners of the 
second-largest lumber company in the Maritimes, threw their very consider-
able support behind the Conservative "Maritime Rights" candidates in the 
federal election of 1925.25 In that year, MacLean became the titular leader 
of the protest movement as president of the Maritime Board of Trade. 
Although labour in the Maritimes was at the peak of its "class" conscious-
ness in 1919, it joined with the business groups in the agitation. Between 1916 
and 1920, reported union membership in the Maritimes had quadrupled to 
about 40,000.25 Spurred by the anticipation of a "new era" to follow the 
War26 and beset by the grim reality of galloping inflation,27 the workers 
attempted new techniques in organization and challenged their employers in 
a series of strikes in 1919 and 1920. At the same time they were conscious 
that their aspirations for a greater share of the fruits of their labour could not 
be achieved if their industries were destroyed from other causes. Early in 
21 Minutes of the Council of the Saint John Board of Trade, 13 July 1922, New Brunswick 
Museum. 
22 Hector Mclnnes to Arthur Meighen, November 1923, Arthur Meighen Papers, p. 051956, 
PAC. 
23 A. MacLean to W. L. M. King, 25 April 1922 and 8 October 1924, W. L. M. King Papers, 
PAC. 
24 J. C. Webster to Arthur Meighen, 26 September 1925, and R. O'Leary to Meighen, 3 Sep-
tember 1925, Arthur Meighan Papers, PAC. 
25 The Fifth Annual Report on Labour Organization in Canada 1916 (Ottawa, 1917), pp. 206-7 
and the Tenth Annual Report on Labour Organization in Canada 1920 (Ottawa, 1921), p. 279. 
26 For examples of their optimistic rhetoric see the Sydney Canadian Labour Leader, 8 Feb-
ruary 1918; the New Glasgow Eastern Federationist, 19, 26 April 1919; and the Moncton Union 
Worker, February 1920. 
27 The Labour Gazette, January 1921, p. 117. 
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1919 the Eastern Federationist, published by the Trades and Labour Council 
of Pictou County, argued that the freight rate increases violated the "rights 
of the Maritime Provinces' people under the terms of Confederation."28 After 
the Amherst "General Strike" in May and June of 1919, the Federationist was 
particularly incensed by reports that the Canada Car Company was planning 
to transfer its Amherst operation to Montreal. The thrust of the editor's 
bitterness was directed at both the capitalists involved and the trend towards 
metropolitan consolidation which posed a continual threat to Maritime 
industry and jobs.29 Similarly the Halifax Citizen, the organ of the local 
Trades and Labour Council, severely criticized the removal of the railway 
headquarters from Moncton and commended the activities of the Maritime 
Board of Trade president, Hance J. Logan, in seeking Maritime union as a 
counterweight to the declining political influence of the region. Bemoaning 
the unfair treatment accorded the Maritimes by the rest of the country, the 
Citizen concluded that there was "very little hope of any justice for us under 
present conditions."30 The journal periodically returned to this theme and 
remained a consistent supporter of Maritime Rights. 
The Railway Brotherhoods, which, after the United Mineworkers, con-
stituted the largest bloc of organized labour in the region, were directly in-
volved in the Maritime Rights campaign. During the first decade of the cen-
tury the brotherhoods had won the acceptance of the principle of seniority 
in promotions and lay-offs on the Intercolonial.31 In theory at least, the 
humblest employee could aspire to the highest office on the road. Under the 
new regime after 1918, that principle went by the board. According to one 
estimate, 400 employees were transferred out of the Moncton headquarters 
and any replacements came from other government roads. In addition, the 
repair shops declined and staff was reduced all along the line. To some 
workers it seemed the principle of seniority had been replaced by the prin-
ciple that no Maritimer need apply.32 
Labour did not need to be coaxed into the Maritime Rights movement by 
the Halifax Herald or other politically-oriented journals in the 1920's; large 
segments were already there, drawn by a consideration of their own immedi-
ate interest. The railway centres provided the most consistent voting support 
for Maritime Rights candidates throughout the 1920's. F. B. McCurdy at-
tributed his victory in the important Colchester by-election of 1920 to the 
28 Eastern Federationist, 8 March 1919. 
29 Ibid., 7 June 1919. 
30 The Halifax Citizen, 21 May and 10 September 1920. 
31 "Being an address by Mr. Geo. W. Yates, Assistant Deputy Minister of Railways, Before the 
History and Political Science Club of Western Ontario, Feb. 16, 1923", Arthur Meighan Papers, 
pp. 157485-9, PAC. 
32 The Busy East, June and July 1923. 
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railway workers' belief that in the cabinet he would "be strong enough to 
afford some relief in the railway grievance." He blamed his defeat in the 
general election of 1921 on his inability to do so.33 Labour also threw its sup-
port behind W. A. Black in the Halifax by-election of 1923.34 Neil Herman, 
Labour-organizer, Social Gospel clergyman and sometime editor of the Hali-
fax Citizen was a founder and executive member of the Halifax Maritime 
Club.35 He later accompanied its president, H. S. Congdon, in a tour of Cen-
tral Canada to drum up newspaper support for the movement. When the so-
called "Great" Maritime Rights delegation went to Ottawa in February 1925, 
J. E. Tighe, president of the Saint John local of the International Longshore-
man's Association, was one of four speakers who addressed the Members of 
Parliament on Maritime problems.36 
The farmers were only slightly behind labour in their support for Maritime 
Rights. They too had expected to play a greater role in the new society which 
was supposed to follow the war; instead they were confronted by the realities 
of rural depopulation and community disintegration.37 They challenged the 
business groups with new or intensified, political, occupational and economic 
organization. But their problems were in part those of the region. The new 
freight rates hit them, both as producers and consumers. Some were also 
angered by federal policies which seemed not only to encourage new immi-
grants to by-pass their region but also to promote westward migration at their 
expense. As much as they might resent the growth of industrial towns and 
their own relative loss in status, the farmers were conscious of their depen-
dence on these towns for their markets. Even those who sold their apples or 
potatoes in Great Britain or the West Indies usually earned a significant pro-
portion of their income in local markets — an important hedge against the 
sometimes widely fluctuating international prices.38 
For a brief period the farmers' regional concern was obscured by their par-
ticipation in what they believed was a national "class" movement. But their 
organizations, such as the Canadian Council of Agriculture, were dominated 
by the Prairies. Manitobans, T. A. Crerar and George Chipman, also sought 
to direct the movement in the Maritimes through the United Farmers' Guide. 
The Guide, theoretically the organ of the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia 
33 F. B. McCurdy to Robert Borden, 21 December 1921, Robert Meighan Papers, PAC. 
34 H. L. Stewart to W. L. M. King, 9 December 1923, W. L. M. King Papers, PAC. 
35 "Minutes of the Maritime Club of Halifax," 11 February 1924, H. S. Congdon Papers (cour-
tesy of Mr. H. H. Congdon, Huntsville, Ontario). 
36 Saint John Telegraph Journal, 27 February 1925. 
37 See A. A. Mackenzie, "The Rise and Fall of the Farmer-Labour Party in Nova Scotia" (M.A. 
thesis, Dalhousie University, 1969) and L. A. Wood, A History of Farmer Movements in Canada 
(Toronto, 1924). 
38 Proceedings of the Select Special Committee of the House of Commons to inquire into Agri-
cultural Conditions (Ottawa, 1924), p. 475. 
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United Farmers Associations, was in fact a subsidiary of the Grain Growers' 
Guide.*9 The two regionalisms were soon in conflict. Western organizers tried 
in vain to get unequivocal statements against the tariff from the United 
Farmers of Nova Scotia and were cool to suggestions that "necessary" pro-
tection for local industries should be retained.40 At the same time they 
offered no support for the Maritime positions on such issues as the Inter-
colonial, freight rates and subsidies. Most Maritime farmers realized they 
could not achieve their regional goals through a movement which was, in 
federal politics at least, "an agrarian and sectional bloc from the continental 
West, the representation of the monolithic wheat economy.41 In 1921 support 
for the western-affiliated United Farmers Associations rapidly dwindled. By 
mid-summer "a majority" in the Maritime Co-operative Companies was re-
ported anxious to dispose of the United Farmers Guide in which they had 
initially invested but were unable to control.42 
The agricultural interests of Prince Edward Island had been involved in 
the Maritime Rights movement from the outset. At the Maritime Board of 
Trade meeting in 1919 they were happy to associate with the broader issues 
of the movement their own special problems. These were two: the need for 
a second car ferry and the completion of the widening of their narrow guage 
railways to permit a more rapid, reliable and cheaper delivery of their 
products to mainland markets.43 In 1921 the Mainland farmers met in con-
ference with representatives of manufacturing, merchant and shipping groups 
to launch a delegation to Ottawa to demand the return of the Intercolonial 
to independent management.44 Thereafter, farm leaders assumed an increas-
ingly important role in the Maritime Rights agitation. In 1923, for example, 
A. E. McMahon, president of the United Fruit Companies and a former vice-
president of the United Farmers of Nova Scotia, became president of the 
Maritime Board of Trade, and, a year later, of the Maritime Development 
Association. One of the primary purposes of the latter organization was the 
rehabilitation of the rural areas through immigration and colonization.45 
39 Three of the five members of the directorate were Manitobans. C. F. Chipman to "The 
Editor" Maritime Farmer, 13 March 1920, T. A. Crerar Papers, The Douglas Library, Queens 
University. 
40 J. M. Pratt to T. A. Crerar, 9 November 1920, and G. G. Archibald to T. A. Crerar, 4 Octo-
ber 1920, ibid. 
41 W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto, 1950), p. 129. 
42 S. H. Hagerman to G. F. Chipman, 18 June 1921, T. A. Crerar Papers, Douglas Library, 
Queens University. 
43 The Busy East, September 1919. See also M. K. Cullen, "The Transportation Issue, 1873-
1973" in F. W. P. Bolger, ed., Canada's Smallest Province: a History of Prince Edward Island 
(Charlottetown, 1973), pp. 255-7. 
44 Ibid., May 1921. 
45 Charlottetown Evening Patriot, 23 January 1925. 
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The fishermen's contribution to the Maritime Rights movement was largely 
restricted to the intensification of the discontent which underlay it. Their 
aspirations had been relatively moderate. The victims of a declining salt fish 
trade with the West Indies, they hoped to restore their industry through the 
expansion of their sales of fresh fish in Central Canada and New England. 
The former had been encouraged by a federal subsidy of one third of the 
express rate to Montreal on less than carload lots, the latter by a modus vi-
vendi with the United States which had permitted them to land and sell their 
catches directly at American ports.46 In 1919, the federal subsidies on fresh 
fish were terminated just as the trade was hit by the higher freight rates.47 
Needless to say, the fish merchants passed on their losses to the largely un-
organized fishermen. Meanwhile, the door to the New England market was 
slammed shut by the American cancellation of the modus vivendi and the 
introduction of the Fordney tariff. 
In the election of 1921, some fishermen seem to have accepted the Liberal 
promises of reciprocity to restore the American markets.48 When this failed 
to materialize, their desperate plight led many (for example, the Yarmouth 
halibut fleet) to pack up and move to the United States.49 Those who re-
mained formed one group in Maritime society which seemed genuinely pre-
pared to contemplate secession in their frantic search for markets. It was 
surely no coincidence that both Howard Corning, who proposed the famous 
secession resolution of 1923, and the lawyer Robert Blauveldt, self-proclaimed 
secessionist and Maritime Rights publicist50 were both residents of Yarmouth 
county. 
The role of professional classes in the Maritime Rights movement was 
prominent, but their motivation ambiguous. It is often difficult to discern 
whether lawyers, doctors, clergymen, academics and journalists were speak-
ing for themselves or for the other groups in society by whom they were 
directly or indirectly employed. Certainly they played an important function 
in articulating and rationalizing the aspirations of the other groups. This role 
was explicit in some cases. The Nova Scotia government retained H. F. Munro 
of Dalhousie University to aid in the preparation of its submission to the 
46 Report of the Royal Commission Investigating the Fisheries of the Maritime Provinces and 
the Magdalen Islands (Ottawa, 1928) pp. 32, 61-5. 
47 «"Fifty-third Annual Report of the Fisheries Branch . . . 1919," Sessional Papers (1919), No. 
44, p. 11. 
48 G. B. Kenny reported to Hector Maclnnes after a trip along the Eastern Shore that the 
Liberal candidates had "actually got many people to believe that real free trade with the U.S. is 
in sight." 21 November 1921, Hector Maclnnes Papers, (courtesy of Donald Maclnnes, Halifax, 
N.S.). 
49 Transcripts of the hearings of the Royal Commission Investigating the Fisheries . . . 1928, p. 
3476, APTC. 
50 R. Blauveldt to H. S. Congdon, 30 September 1924, H. S. Congdon Papers. 
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Duncan Commission. The boards of trade hired freight rate experts, pro-
fessional organizers and lawyers to prepare, publicize and help present their 
cases before the federal government and its various commissions. Significant 
also was the relationship between Maritime Rights journalists and the in-
terests who paid their salaries, or patronized their newspapers through adver-
tising and subscriptions. The lumberman-industrialist, Angus MacLean, for 
example, was reportedly "the principal owner" of the Saint John Telegraph 
Journal.1'1 That paper in 1925 promoted the cross-country speaking-tours of 
president J. D. McKenna and editor A. B. Belding as part of its campaign for 
Maritime Rights. Similarly C. W. Lunn, who was credited with the initial 
popularization of the defence of the Intercolonial as guaranteed under the 
"compact of confederation," aspired to a labour readership and was even 
hired for a brief period to write for the Eastern Federationist. " More tenuous 
but still significant was the relationship between clergymen and the congre-
gations which they represented. It is clear, for example, that the priests who 
protested the Duncan Commission's failure to help the fishermen were acting 
as agents for the fishermen in their parishes. Their intervention resulted in the 
Royal Commission investigation of the fisheries in 1928.53 
In articulating the progressive reform ideology, which provided an im-
portant element in the developing Maritime regionalism, the professionals' 
motivation was also ambiguous. As various American scholars have pointed 
out, "progressivism" with its optimism, social criticism and focus on govern-
ment as an agent of reform might be inspired by many and mixed motives.54 
To farmers, labour and their representatives, "progressivism" could be the 
desire to improve the lot of the weak and exploited, namely themselves. On 
the part of the business-oriented it might be concern for efficiency, the re-
placement of old-fashioned party structures, and the development of a more 
dynamic role by government which might more effectively serve the interests 
of the entrepreneur. To the professionals, besides any humanitarian concern, 
"progressivism" might mean an improved status or an expansion of their role 
in society in social work, health services or the government bureaucracy. 
In the Maritimes, the clergy and academics were most prominent in articu-
lating the various strains of an amorphous progressive ideology. The clergy, 
imbued with the social gospel, promoted a variety of reforms ranging from 
prohibition to widows' pensions and occasionally engaged in wholesale at-
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tacks on the capitalist system.55 Academics used a more secular terminology 
but they too championed a wide range of reforms for the welfare of the com-
munity. Dr. F. H. Sexton hailed Nova Scotia's programme of technical edu-
cation — he happened to be its superintendent — as a valuable means of 
"social service" in improving the lot of the miners and industrial workers.56 
That it was also a service for local industry went without saying. Dr. Melville 
Cummings, of the Truro Agricultural College and Rev. Hugh MacPherson 
of Saint Francis Xavier University displayed a similar zeal for agricultural 
education and farmers' co-operatives as the means of rural regeneration. 
President George B. Cutten of Acadia University, having failed to persuade 
governments to undertake the hydro-electric development of the Bay of 
Fundy, organized the Cape Split Development Company in an attempt to 
interest private capital in the scheme.57 
All these progressive proposals placed strong pressure upon provincial 
governments to inaugurate or expand programmes for which revenue was not 
readily available. This fact led progressive elements into an ephemeral cam-
paign for Maritime union, which was expected to provide a more efficient 
use of available resources58,- and into a more substantive campaign for Mari-
time unity, one object of which was to wrest from the Federal Government 
a "fair" share of Dominion revenues. 
Increased federal subsidies were sought, for example, by professionals 
concerned about the declining quality of instruction in the schools as higher 
salaries drew experienced teachers westward. But, since fiscal need had never 
been accepted as a justification for higher subsidies, Maritime governments 
developed the claim that they were entitled to monetary compensation for 
grants of land from the public domain—grants such as had been given to On-
Tario, Manitoba and Quebec in the boundary settlements of 1912. They also 
demanded subsidies in lieu of the increasingly lucrative "school lands" funds 
held in trust by the federal government for the Prairie Provinces. The Maritime 
Educational Convention at Moncton in 1918 and a Catholic educational con-
ference at Antigonish a year later both discussed the subsidy claims as a mat-
ter vital to educational reform.59 In the latter year the Conservative Halifax 
Herald enthusiastically endorsed a Liberal resolution which outlined the 
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Maritime claims in the Nova Scotian Legislature. The "serious material injus-
tice" inflicted upon the Maritimes through "the unfair distribution which has 
been made of federal assets by successive governments" had, according to the 
Herald, starved local government services or supplied them" in such a niggard-
ly manner that progress is almost impossible" The Herald advocated the 
launching of "a concerted movement and (sic) properly directed activity. 
We suggest that a maritime popular league should be forthwith organized, 
with provincial and county and town and village branches in all parts of the 
Maritime provinces, until the whole country has been enlightened, aroused 
and arrayed in a support of the resolution unanimously adopted by the Nova 
Scotia legislature. '*° Although as their problems increased, Maritimers sought 
more fundamental solutions, the subsidy claims remained one of the basic 
components of the campaign for Maritime rights. 
The Maritime Rights agitation which had emerged by 1919 was a regional 
protest movement which saw all classes united in their demands upon the 
rest of the country. This did not mean that different classes did not have dis-
tinct aspirations of their own; on the contrary, they were probably more con-
scious of them in 1919 than in any other period before or since. Each held a 
dream of progressive development in which its own collective interests were 
directly involved: for the manufacturers, their growth as the major industrial 
suppliers of the country; for the urban merchants, the final attainment of 
their communities' status as the entrepots of Canada's trade; for labour and 
farmers, the emergence of a new more democratic society in which they 
would break the economic and political dominance of the business classes; 
for the fishermen, the chance to rehabilitate their industry through the new 
fresh fish trade; and for the professionals, the elevation of Maritime society 
through education. But none of these aspirations was capable of realization 
with the continued decline of the economic and political status of the Mari-
times in the Dominion. Just as electricity might channel the usually conflict-
ing molecular energies of an iron bar to produce a magnetic force, so the 
federal government's adverse policies served to re-align the various "classes" 
in the Maritimes to produce a powerful social force — regionalism. This 
force, dressed up in a variety of complex rationalizations, became the Mari-
time Rights movement of the 1920's. 
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